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Abstract 
 
The proponents of neuroeconomics often argue that better knowledge of 
the human neural architecture enables economists to improve standard 
models of choice. In their view, these improvements provide 
compelling reasons to use neural findings in constructing and 
evaluating economic models. In a recent paper, I criticized this view by 
pointing to the trade-offs between the modelling desiderata valued by 
neuroeconomists and other economists respectively. The present article 
complements my former critique by focusing on three modelling 
desiderata that figure prominently in economic and neuroeconomic 
modelling. For each desideratum, I examine findings that 
neuroeconomists deem to be especially relevant for economists and 
argue that neuroeconomists have failed to substantiate their calls to use 
these findings in constructing and evaluating economic models. In 
doing so, I identify methodological and evidential constraints that will 
continue to hinder neuroeconomists’ attempts to improve such models. 
Moreover, I draw on the literature on scientific modelling to advance 
the ongoing philosophical discussion regarding the prospects of 
interdisciplinary models of choice. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The advocates of neuroeconomics (henceforth, NE) frequently argue 
that better knowledge of the human neural architecture enables 
economists to improve standard models of choice. In their view (see 
e.g. Camerer et al., 2005, and Glimcher, 2010, ch.4-6), these 
improvements provide compelling reasons to use neural findings in 
constructing and evaluating economic models. For their part, several 
economists question the relevance of neuroeconomists’ (henceforth, 
NEs) contributions for the economic modelling of choice. In particular, 
some put forward methodological considerations to doubt that neural 
findings do (e.g. Rubinstein, 2008) or even can possibly (e.g. Gul and 
Pesendorfer, 2008) inform their models. Others (e.g. Harrison, 2008) 
contend that the evidential limitations inherent in current NE studies 
make it at least premature to employ neural findings in constructing and 
evaluating economic models.1 
 
The ongoing debate between NEs and other economists has attracted 
increasing attention by philosophers (see e.g. Hausman, 2008, Mäki, 
2010, Ross, 2008, and Vromen, 2010). In a recent article (Fumagalli, 
2011), I developed a philosophical critique of NE that builds on the 
pragmatic and epistemic goals governing the construction and the 
evaluation of economic models. My critique in that article points to the 
trade-offs between the modelling desiderata valued by NEs and other 
economists respectively. The idea is that distinct desiderata often make 
dissimilar demands on modellers and that these trade-offs significantly 
constrain NEs’ attempts to improve economic models. The present 
paper complements my former critique by focusing on three modelling 
desiderata that figure prominently in economic and NE modelling. 
 
More specifically, I consider in turn descriptive accuracy, predictive 
power, and explanatory relevance. For each desideratum, I articulate 
several conceptual distinctions, examine findings that NEs deem to be 
especially relevant for economists, and assess the relevance of NEs’ 
contributions for the economic modelling of choice. I shall argue for the 
following claims. Economists can improve some models of choice with 
regard to specific desiderata by using neural findings. However, NEs 
systematically overstate the extent to which neural findings help 
economists to improve their models. Moreover, even leading NEs gloss 
over methodological and evidential concerns that will continue to 
hinder their attempts to build models that supersede those developed by 
other economists. These considerations do not license unqualified 
                                                 
1 Different approaches to NE have been developed (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2010, 
and Ross, 2008, for some conceptual distinctions). In this article, I speak 
generally of NE unless the differences between distinct approaches are 
material to my evaluation of NEs’ proposals. Also, I employ the expressions 
‘economic models of choice’ and ‘standard economic models’ broadly to 
indicate both individual and strategic decision theoretic models. 
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scepticism regarding the prospects of NE. Still, taken together, they cast 
serious doubts on NEs’ calls to use neural findings in constructing and 
evaluating economic models. 
 
Before proceeding, three preliminary remarks are in order. Firstly, the 
list of desiderata I examine does not encompass all the respects in 
which neural findings are claimed to inform standard economic 
modelling. In particular, it does not include NEs’ attempts to provide 
normative evaluations of decisions. I am not concerned here with 
assessing normative NE analyses. For present purposes, it suffices to 
note that these analyses face additional difficulties besides those 
affecting positive NE contributions (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2013a, for a 
critique of recent calls to use neural findings to measure and enhance 
individuals’ well-being).2 
 
Secondly, each of the desiderata I consider has been defined in 
dissimilar ways in the literature on scientific modelling. This 
occasionally complicates the assessment of neural findings’ relevance 
for model construction and model evaluation in economics. However, it 
does not preclude us from providing precise and relatively 
uncontroversial characterizations of the desiderata we examine. In what 
follows, I comment in various places on such characterizations and their 
interrelations. In doing so, I do not take economists’ modelling 
practices to constitute an unquestionable normative benchmark. On the 
contrary, I prevalently regard such practices as a useful point of 
reference for explicating and assessing NEs’ calls to use neural findings 
in economic modelling. 
 
Finally, this article aims to advance the ongoing discussion regarding 
the prospects of interdisciplinary models of choice in at least three 
respects of general interest to philosophers of the social sciences. 
Firstly, it provides a philosophically informed evaluation of recent 
advances at the interface between economics, psychology and 
neuroscience that are potentially relevant to social scientific research. 
Secondly, it draws novel connections between parallel debates about the 
modelling of choice that are still insufficiently integrated across distinct 
decision sciences. And thirdly, it combines considerations from neuro-
psychological studies, economic methodology and philosophy of 
science to develop a systematic critique of prominent calls in favour of 
interdisciplinary models of choice. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 NEs occasionally advocate using neural findings to support - rather than 
improve or substitute - standard economic models of choice (see e.g. Camerer, 
2008a). I shall focus predominantly on NEs’ attempts to improve or substitute 
standard economic models, as most debates between NEs and other 
economists target these contributions. 
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1. Descriptive Accuracy 
 
 
A model’s descriptive accuracy can be evaluated along several 
dimensions. Two senses of ‘descriptive accuracy’ are often 
distinguished in the literature on scientific modelling (see e.g. 
Weisberg, 2007). On the one hand, there is the question whether a 
model represents the relevant properties and entities figuring in its 
target system.3 On the other hand, one can assess how detailed a 
model’s characterization of each of these properties and entities is. 
These two senses of descriptive accuracy are conceptually distinct. For 
instance, a model may represent most of the properties of its target 
system, but fail to characterize these properties in detail. Another 
model, instead, may represent just a small subset of those properties, yet 
provide a detailed characterization of them.4 
 
NEs frequently claim that neural findings enable economists to increase 
the descriptive accuracy of their models in both of these respects. In 
particular, they argue that economists can obtain significant predictive 
and explanatory benefits by building models that provide accurate 
characterizations of the neural substrates of decisions (see e.g. Camerer 
et al., 2005, and Glimcher, 2010, ch.5-6). Their reasoning goes as 
follows. Standard economic models omit neural entities and properties 
that are known to influence decisions. Moreover, they make implausible 
assumptions concerning agents’ cognitive and computational abilities. 
Due to these limitations, several economic models fail to be predictive 
and explanatory. Fortunately, neural findings enable economists to 
build models that represent neural entities and properties that are known 
to influence decisions. Furthermore, they facilitate the construction of 
models that make more plausible assumptions concerning agents’ 
cognitive and computational abilities. These modelling benefits, in turn, 
help economists to construct predictive and explanatory models. Hence, 
economists should employ neural findings in building their models. 
 
These considerations point to some of the alleged benefits NEs 
associate with models that accurately characterize the neural substrates 
of decisions. However, they do not provide economists with convincing 
grounds to use neural findings in constructing their models. Below I 
                                                 
3 What entities and properties are deemed to be relevant in a given context 
may importantly depend both on the modellers’ aims and on what notion of 
relevance they presuppose (see e.g. Mäki, 2009, and Matthewson and 
Weisberg, 2009). I shall explicate how these two issues bear on the merits of 
NEs’ contributions in various places throughout the paper. For now, it suffices 
to note that the modelling practices of NEs and other economists differ 
remarkably with regard to both of those issues. 
4 I speak of models ‘representing’ or ‘omitting’ entities and properties without 
specifying what modelling devices (e.g. adding or removing variables, altering 
functional forms) modellers may use to do so. I shall comment on the 
differences between these modelling devices whenever the cogency of my 
claims rests on such differences. 
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identify and discuss two reasons in support of this claim. Firstly, 
building predictive and explanatory models of choice does not require 
economists to provide accurate characterizations of the neural substrates 
of decisions. And secondly, it is questionable whether NEs are in the 
epistemic position to provide accurate characterizations of these 
substrates. 
 
i) Economists investigate their target systems at different levels of detail 
and for dissimilar purposes. In particular, they frequently build 
predictive and explanatory models by isolating and distorting specific 
features of their phenomena of interest (see e.g. Cartwright, 2009, and 
Mäki, 2009). Moreover, they often acquire predictive and explanatory 
insights by relying on models which do not accurately characterize any 
actual phenomena, but rather target hypothetical or even counterfactual 
states of affairs (see e.g. Gibbard and Varian, 1978, and Sugden, 2000 
and 2009). For these reasons, the mere fact that a choice model does not 
provide accurate characterizations of the neural substrates of decisions 
does not preclude such model from yielding predictive and explanatory 
insights to economists. 
 
A proponent of NE may concede that choice models that do not provide 
accurate characterizations of the neural substrates of decisions can be 
predictive and explanatory for economists. At the same time, she might 
object that building predictive and explanatory models typically 
requires economists to provide accurate characterizations of such 
substrates. Unfortunately, even this claim fails to withstand scrutiny. By 
way of illustration, consider the often-made assumption that agents 
calculate the expected utility of the available options using perfect 
Bayesian updating with negligible cognitive costs. This assumption 
clearly exaggerates human individuals’ cognitive and computational 
abilities. Yet, it enables economists to predict decisions across a wide 
range of settings (e.g. think of repetitive choices). Furthermore, 
economists have made significant predictive advances by building 
models that, while relaxing such assumption, do not make any claim 
concerning the neural substrates of decisions (see e.g. Machina, 1987, 
and Starmer, 2000, for a review).5 
 
Analogous remarks apply to economic models that deliberately omit 
neural entities and properties that are known to influence decisions. To 
see this, let us focus on the issue of preference change. Standard 
economic models posit agents having exogenously fixed preferences, 
which do not vary unless such agents learn novel information about 
their choice options. However, the preferences of real-life individuals 
are frequently constructed during decision-making (see e.g. Guala, 
                                                 
5 A proponent of NE might object that these predictive advances do not 
exclude that NEs could further improve economists’ predictions by 
constructing models that provide accurate characterizations of the neural 
substrates of decisions. However, NEs still have to substantiate this conjecture 
(see Section 2 on some major limitations affecting most NEs’ predictions). 
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2005, ch.5). Moreover, not all instances of preference change seem 
prompted by information learning. For instance, an agent’s preferences 
may vary depending on which of her options’ features are salient, with 
changes in what features are salient occurring in the absence of 
variations in the agent’s information set. 
 
Now, economists’ reliance on models positing exogenously fixed 
preferences is rarely due to their alleged ignorance of preferences’ 
variability. On the contrary, this practice is usually motivated by 
specific modelling goals and considerations (e.g. simplicity). Moreover, 
several economic models of preference change have been developed to 
deal with cases where standard models fail to be predictive and 
explanatory. For example, Dietrich and List (2011) model situations 
where preferences can vary without agents learning any novel 
information about their choice options. Their contribution generalizes 
standard economic models by providing a representation theorem for 
both information-based and non-informational preference change. 
 
The aforementioned examples point to a more general reason why 
building predictive and explanatory models does not require economists 
to provide accurate characterizations of the neural substrates of 
decisions. This reason relates to the so-called derivational robustness of 
economic models’ implications with respect to variations in 
assumptions concerning the neural substrates of decisions. The 
expression ‘derivational robustness’ indicates the degree to which a 
model’s implications hold under variations in the assumptions used to 
derive them (see e.g. Woodward, 2006). The implications of economic 
models are often robust under significant variations in assumptions 
concerning the neural substrates of decisions. To give one example, 
consider a famous series of computerized market experiments by Gode 
and Sunder (1993), who replace human traders with ‘zero-intelligence’ 
programs that submit random bids and offers. As shown by Gode and 
Sunder, imposing a simple budget constraint on trades robustly leads to 
market allocative efficiency irrespective of traders’ cognitive and 
computational abilities (see Lehtinen and Kuorikoski, 2007, for 
additional examples). 
 
A proponent of NE may concede that the implications of several 
economic models are robust under variations in assumptions concerning 
the neural substrates of decisions. At the same time, she might insist 
that economic models that neglect information about such substrates 
often fail to be predictive and explanatory. In particular, she might 
contend that the implications of economic models of choice frequently 
change in response to variations in behavioural or psychological 
assumptions. This latter contention is not without merit (see e.g. Goeree 
and Holt, 2001, on how alterations in payoff structures can generate 
inconsistencies between game theoretic predictions and observed 
strategic behaviour). Still, it does not per se support the claim that 
building predictive and explanatory models requires economists to 
provide accurate characterizations of the neural substrates of decisions. 
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In this respect, it is telling that NEs rarely attempt to demonstrate that 
limitations in the predictive and explanatory performance of economic 
models are due to these models’ failure to provide accurate 
characterizations of those substrates.6 
 
ii) Suppose - for the sake of argument - that NEs demonstrated that 
building predictive and explanatory models of choice requires 
economists to provide accurate characterizations of the neural substrates 
of decisions. Even so, the question would remain as to whether NEs are 
in the epistemic position to provide accurate characterizations of such 
substrates. Over the last few years, NEs have claimed to measure 
several variables (e.g. neural correlates of specific choices) that 
economists previously regarded as unobserved or even unobservable. 
As Camerer puts it, NE “is not in opposition to rational choice theory, 
but sees potential in extending its scope by observing variables that are 
considered inherently unobservable in [it]” (2008b, 45). 
 
These alleged advances may be interesting to choice modellers, but do 
not substantiate the claim that NEs are in the epistemic position to 
provide accurate characterizations of the neural substrates of decisions. 
There are at least two reasons to doubt such claim. The first reason 
relates to well-known limitations in the accuracy and reliability of the 
tools used to collect and interpret the data on which NEs’ models are 
based (see e.g. Logothetis, 2008, on the haemodynamic proxies used to 
estimate neural activity in fMRI studies). The idea is that the limitations 
inherent in NEs’ observational tools hamper their attempts to provide 
accurate characterizations of the neural substrates of decisions and that 
providing these characterizations requires NEs to alleviate or 
circumvent such limitations (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2013b). 
 
The second reason to doubt that NEs are in the epistemic position to 
provide accurate characterizations of the neural substrates of decisions 
concerns the complexity of these substrates.7 This point can be 
                                                 
6 Intense debates have taken place in the philosophy of science concerning the 
epistemic import of robustness analysis. In particular, some (e.g. Odenbaugh 
and Alexandrova, 2011) allege that robustness analysis is best regarded as a 
method of discovery of robust theorems. Others (e.g. Kuorikoski et al., 2010 
and 2012) argue that robustness analysis can justifiably increase modellers’ 
degree of confidence in the robust theorems which connect their models’ 
substantial assumptions to specific modelling results. I do not take a position 
in this debate for the purpose of my article. 
7 Several notions of complexity have been distinguished by philosophers of 
science. For instance, Mitchell alleges that a target system is: compositionally 
complex, if it is “constituted by a [high number of] nonrandomly structured 
parts”; dynamically complex, if it is “the location for multiple, interacting 
causes some of which are represented as […] non-linear functions”; and 
evolutionarily complex, if it displays “a variety of historically contingent, 
adaptive responses to environmental challenges” (2002, 58). The neural 
substrates of decisions can be regarded as a rather complex target system in all 
these three senses. 
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explicated as follows. The workings of the human neural architecture 
are influenced by a number of factors, ranging from the presence of 
particular environmental cues to the momentary availability of 
metabolic resources (see e.g. Wilcox, 2008). Interactions between brain 
regions exhibit high degrees of anatomical and functional 
interdependence in terms of involved neural populations, connectivity 
patterns, and so on (see e.g. Cisek, 2012). For these reasons, specific 
NE models can endogenize a small subset of the neural entities and 
properties that influence individuals’ decisions (e.g. think of choices 
between long-term, non-stimulus-bound alternatives). 
 
To be sure, advances in scanner technology and experimental design 
may help NEs to build models that endogenize a higher number of 
neural entities and properties. Moreover, NEs might provide 
increasingly accurate characterizations of the neural substrates of 
decisions by using clusters of models that yield complementary insights 
about such substrates (see e.g. Bechtel, 2002, on the opportunity to 
combine brain-imaging and brain-stimulation instruments to support 
conjectures about the human neural architecture). Still, the point 
remains that specific NE models are typically bound to represent only a 
small subset of the entities and properties figuring in their target 
systems. In this respect, it is worth noting that even models of basic 
sensorimotor tasks make deliberately inaccurate assumptions about 
their targets and include several free parameters (see e.g. Fernandes and 
Kording, 2010).8 
 
 
 
2. Predictive Power 
 
 
The predictive power of a model can be evaluated in several respects. 
Choice modellers ordinarily distinguish between: predictive accuracy, 
which refers to how close a model’s predictions are to the actual value 
of the examined variables; predictive robustness, which concerns the 
stability of a model’s predictive performance across distinct settings; 
and predictive reliability, which relates to the degree to which a 
model’s predictions can be expected to hold in a particular context. 
These three notions are not unrelated, yet point to different aspects of 
models’ predictive power. For instance, a model may yield very 
accurate predictions, but only in specific settings. Another model, 
instead, may make less accurate predictions that hold across a wider 
range of contexts. Furthermore, each notion of predictive power can be 
                                                 
8 NE models that represent a small subset of the entities and properties 
figuring in their target systems may still count as descriptively accurate, 
provided that these entities and properties are relevant to the modelling task at 
hand and are given a detailed characterization by such models. However, as I 
argue in Sections 2 and 3, NEs rarely put forward models that, while 
representing just a few neural entities and properties, are predictive and 
explanatory for other economists. 
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evaluated along different dimensions. For example, one may deem a 
model’s predictions to be more or less accurate depending on whether 
she considers the occurrence of the predicted events, the magnitude of 
these events, or the time at which those events occur. 
 
NEs often criticize economic models for failing to provide accurate, 
robust and reliable predictions of choices (see e.g. Loewenstein et al., 
2008, and McCabe, 2008). Moreover, they argue that economists could 
obtain substantial predictive gains in these respects by using neural 
findings. Some even take these purported gains to constitute NE’s most 
significant contribution to the economic modelling of choice. As 
Camerer puts it, “the largest payoff from [NE] may come from pointing 
to biological variables which have a large influence on behaviour and 
are underweighted or ignored in standard theory” (2007, C35). To be 
sure, some authors (e.g. Rustichini, 2009) acknowledge that economists 
may make accurate predictions without having detailed knowledge of 
the neural substrates of decisions. Yet, most proponents of NE insist 
that models that do not provide accurate characterizations of these 
substrates frequently fail to predict choices (see e.g. Schotter, 2008). 
 
At first glance, one may expect economists to welcome NEs’ insistence 
on predictive gains. After all - the thought would be - economists of all 
stripes ascribe a prominent relevance to predictive considerations. 
Nonetheless, at least two major limitations almost invariably constrain 
the relevance of NEs’ predictions for other economists. Firstly, most 
NE studies make predictions over exceedingly limited time spans to be 
valuable to economists. And secondly, NEs’ attempts to improve 
economists’ predictions face some severe challenges. Let us examine 
these two limitations in turn. 
 
i) If NEs are to substantiate their calls to use neural findings to make 
economic predictions, their rationale should go beyond the econometric 
platitude that when one expands the set of explanatory variables in a 
model, the correlation between these variables and the dependent 
variable is almost bound to increase. For one could increase this 
correlation by using variables that few economists would employ to 
predict choices.9 To give one example, the alleged fact that sunshine 
significantly correlates with daily stock returns in several countries (see 
e.g. Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003) falls short of implying that 
economists should include meteorological variables in their models of 
the financial market. Over the last decade, NEs have provided some 
persuasive illustrations of how neural findings may help choice 
                                                 
9 Such correlation may not increase if the explanatory variable one includes is 
statistically independent from the dependent variable. Indeed, one might even 
worsen a model’s predictive performance by incorporating more variables into 
it. The idea, which relates to the so-called problem of overfitting, is that 
including more variables into a model could render it exceedingly sensitive to 
idiosyncrasies in the initial data set, thereby leading it to make predictions that 
are inferior to those it would have otherwise made in additional data sets (see 
e.g. Hitchcock and Sober, 2004). 
10 
 
modellers to predict individuals’ decisions. Three classes of 
contributions seem particularly significant in this context. 
 
The first class of contributions attempt to predict choices by means of 
experimentally regimented observations of specific areas’ activations. 
For example, Knutson et al. (2007) illustrate that activations observed 
in the nucleus accumbens, the insula, and the mesial prefrontal cortex 
occasionally predict purchase decisions even better than self-report 
variables. The second class of contributions purport to improve choice 
modellers’ out of sample predictions thanks to more detailed knowledge 
of the neural substrates of decisions. The idea is to use the neural data 
gathered in specific experimental settings to better predict decisions in 
other experiments and real-life situations. For instance, in a study of the 
neural basis of altruistic punishment, de Quervain et al. (2004) predict 
variations in punishers’ willingness to pay for punishment when such 
punishment is costly for them on the basis of activations observed in the 
caudate when punishment is costless for these punishers. 
 
The third class of contributions aim to induce predictable variations in 
individuals’ choices by stimulating or disrupting activations in neural 
areas that putatively contribute to the execution of such choices. By 
way of illustration, let us focus on some studies of the neural substrates 
of strategic decision-making. In an often-quoted fMRI study, Sanfey et 
al. (2003) document that the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), an area frequently taken to serve cognitive control and goal 
maintenance, undergoes increased activation in presence of unfair 
offers in ultimatum games. Building on this finding, Wout et al. (2005) 
demonstrate that disrupting activation in the right DLPFC via repetitive 
TMS predictably alters both subjects’ propensity to reject unfair offers 
and their reaction times for rejecting unfair offers. This study extends 
previous correlational results by corroborating hypotheses about the 
causal role of the right DLPFC in strategic decision-making. 
  
These predictive accomplishments are promising, but are rarely shown 
by NEs to yield significant predictive benefits to other economists. My 
point is not just that NEs’ use of small experimental samples and multi-
stage data manipulation techniques constrains the reliability and the 
robustness of their predictions (see e.g. Harrison, 2008). Rather, my 
main concern relates to the limited time spans covered by such 
predictions. As noted in Section 1, individuals’ choices result from the 
dynamic interactions of several neural populations and factors operating 
at multiple levels of organization. For this reason, monitoring specific 
areas’ activations rarely enables NEs to reliably predict individuals’ 
choices beyond a range of several hundred milliseconds. This temporal 
interval is exceedingly limited for NEs’ predictions to be relevant for 
other economists, who typically aim to predict choices over much 
11 
 
longer time spans. Yet, even leading NEs recurrently gloss over this 
limitation when presenting their findings.10 
 
A proponent of NE may concede that NEs rarely succeed in predicting 
individuals’ choices beyond limited time spans. At the same time, she 
might claim that NEs can make significant predictive advances in this 
respect by categorizing agents into different types. This claim relates to 
the following two-step procedure (see e.g. Rubinstein, 2008). Firstly, 
neural findings are used to identify characteristics (e.g. attitudes to risk) 
that supposedly predict agents’ behaviour across choice domains. And 
secondly, the distribution of agents’ types is employed as a primitive in 
models that predict choices probabilistically over non-negligible 
temporal intervals. Regrettably, NEs have hitherto failed to make 
significant predictive advances in this respect. Moreover, it is 
questionable whether much progress is to be expected on this issue. For 
the characteristics examined by NEs rarely seem stable enough across 
individuals, time spans and choice domains to provide robust agent-type 
categorizations (see e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002, on the influence of 
various incentives on individuals’ risk preferences). 
 
ii) Suppose that NEs identify some neural area whose activations 
exhibit statistically significant and robust correlations with observed 
decisions. Assume, further, that NEs can reliably predict choices over 
extended time spans by examining this area’s activations. This would 
be a remarkable predictive achievement for NEs. In this respect, it 
would be of little import to object that predicting choices from 
endogenous neural activity is “largely orthogonal” to economists’ 
predictive goals (Bernheim, 2009, 23). For although few economists 
currently attempt to predict choices from endogenous neural activity, 
the aforementioned predictive achievement would provide them with a 
convincing reason to use neural findings for predictive purposes. 
Unfortunately, no such predictive achievement is in sight for NEs. 
Moreover, NEs’ attempts to improve economists’ predictions face some 
severe challenges. To illustrate this, let us consider briefly a few 
respects in which neural findings are claimed to yield predictive 
benefits to economists. 
 
NEs frequently maintain to have identified anatomically delimited 
neural populations whose activations predict variables of economic 
interest. For instance, Levy and Glimcher (2012) contend that specific 
                                                 
10 Some NE studies report correlations between specific areas’ activations and 
economic variables over extended temporal intervals. For instance, after 
monitoring a few adolescents who listen to songs of unknown artists, Berns 
and Moore (2012) find that ventral striatum’s activations significantly 
correlate with these songs’ sales among the general public several months 
after scanning. Regrettably, these results are not shown to hold across samples 
and choice situations. Moreover, the authors do not specify how much testing 
was implemented before obtaining those results, and provide no reason to 
exclude that their study reports a rather arbitrary selection of unrepresentative 
findings. 
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sub-regions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the orbitofrontal 
cortex encode the subjective values of individuals’ choice options on a 
common neural scale. This, in turn, allegedly enables NEs to predict 
choices across various types of stimulus-bound rewards and 
experimental conditions. Even so, one should not overemphasize the 
predictive relevance that observed correlations between choices and 
neural activations have for other economists. For NEs’ studies have 
predominantly focused on experimental tasks that are far less 
sophisticated and computationally demanding than decision problems 
commonly faced by human individuals (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2013a). In 
particular, there is no compelling reason to think that the same neural 
mechanisms that contribute to stimulus-bound reward valuation 
determine choice in circumstances where individuals face non-stimulus-
bound alternatives (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2013b). 
 
Analogous considerations hold for NEs’ calls to employ neural findings 
to predict aggregate choice patterns or impute missing economic 
variables. For in primis, it appears to be prohibitively difficult to collect 
the population-level neural findings (e.g. large-scale interpersonal 
distributions of specific areas’ activations) needed to reliably predict 
aggregate choice patterns across diverse decision settings. And 
secondly, neural findings are especially hard to obtain in situations 
where also choice data are missing or inaccurate. To put it differently, it 
seems rather unlikely that we can perform detailed investigations of 
subjects’ brain activity, but cannot collect data about their choices and 
preferences. More generally, NEs have not offered yet any convincing 
reason to expect that NEs will build “a mechanistically accurate 
economic theory which is by necessity predictive” (Glimcher et al., 
2005, 221). 
 
 
 
3. Explanatory Relevance 
 
 
NEs frequently claim that neural findings provide economists with 
highly explanatory insights. For instance, Zak contends that NE 
research “will allow economists to answer fundamental questions they 
are unable to address” (2004, 1738). Similarly, Brocas and Carrillo 
allege that NE studies yield “new reliable theories capable of explaining 
[…] individual behaviour and strategic choices” (2010). Substantiating 
these claims would require NEs to specify what features they take to be 
constitutive of adequate explanations, or at least indicate what account 
of explanation they presuppose. NEs do not always indicate what 
account of explanation they presuppose when claiming that their 
findings are explanatory for economists. However, as illustrated below, 
three accounts of explanation - namely the unificationist, mechanistic, 
and interventionist accounts - figure prominently in NEs’ works. Let us 
assess the explanatory relevance of NEs’ contributions with regard to 
each of these three accounts in turn. 
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i) According to the unificationist account, explanation consists in 
disclosing connections between phenomena that were formerly 
regarded as unrelated (see e.g. Friedman, 1974, and Kitcher, 1981). The 
aim is to demonstrate that seemingly unrelated phenomena are, at 
bottom, manifestations of a common system of entities, processes, and 
so on. In recent years, several NEs have advocated using neural 
findings to account for diverse economic phenomena in terms of some 
basic neuro-cognitive and neuro-computational principles (see below). 
Some (e.g. McCabe, 2003) maintain that more accurate knowledge of 
the human neural architecture enables economists to develop more 
general models of choice, which explain a wider variety of decisions 
than standard economic models. In their view, the “ultimate goal” of 
NE is “to produce [a] detailed computational and neurobiological […] 
common foundation for understanding human behavior across the 
natural and social sciences” (Fehr and Rangel, 2011, 4).11 
 
Do NEs substantiate their unificationist contentions? It does not seem 
so. Indeed, even leading NEs appear to grossly overstate the 
explanatory relevance of their unificationist contributions for economic 
modellers. The following example, which concerns putative NE 
explanations of macroeconomic phenomena, nicely illustrates this 
point. NEs often conjecture that neural findings help economists to 
account for aggregate choice patterns (see e.g. Camerer, 2007, C29). 
McCabe goes as far as to assert that such findings may enable 
economists to better explain “the disparity of economic growth, and 
material welfare, both between and within nations” (2008, 348).  
 
Now, one may certainly tell some story of how neural activations in 
individuals’ brains indirectly influence macroeconomic phenomena by 
shaping individuals’ choices and preferences. Yet, when it comes to 
accounting for macroeconomic growth and welfare, NEs’ findings 
appear to have marginal explanatory relevance for other economists. 
For the influence of neural activations on these phenomena is mediated 
by a number of factors - ranging from institutional incentives to 
individuals’ axiological commitments - that can be only partly 
controlled for in NE studies. That is to say, too many and overly 
speculative inferential steps are required to account for macroeconomic 
phenomena in terms of the neural activations observed in individuals’ 
brains. 
 
A proponent of NE may concede that some NEs overstate the 
explanatory relevance of their findings for economic modellers. Still, 
                                                 
11 Models’ generality can be appraised with regard to both actual and 
hypothetical targets. In particular, one may distinguish between a-generality - 
which concerns how many actual targets a model applies to - and p-generality 
- which relates to how many logically, nomologically or physically possible 
targets a model applies to (Matthewson and Weisberg, 2009, 182). NEs 
prevalently speak of generality in the former sense, but occasionally use this 
term in the latter sense as well. 
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she might insist that NE models can be employed to represent a wide 
variety of choices and therefore serve as useful springboards for 
explanatory unifications. This claim invites the following two-fold 
rejoinder. Firstly, it is doubtful that NE models can be employed to 
represent a greater variety of choices than standard economic models 
(e.g. think of the flexibility of economists’ constrained optimization 
techniques). And secondly, the mere fact that a model enables one to 
represent a vast array of phenomena by no means implies that such 
model advances the development of explanatory - as opposed to merely 
descriptive - accounts of those phenomena (see e.g. Kitcher, 1989, 
sec.4-5, for similar remarks). 
 
ii) Mechanistic explanations account for why a target system of interest 
exhibits particular features by pointing to the features and the 
interactions of its components (see e.g. Bechtel, 2008, ch.1, and Bechtel 
and Richardson, 1993, ch.2). On this account, a choice model is 
explanatory if it accurately identifies the possibly multilevel (e.g. 
psychological, neural) mechanisms whose interactions influence agents’ 
decisions in the investigated settings (see e.g. Craver, 2006, and Craver 
and Alexandrova, 2008). Several NEs urge economists to “ground 
economic theory in detailed neural mechanisms” for both predictive and 
explanatory purposes (Camerer, 2007, C26). Some even claim to have 
identified the basic mechanistic components of reward valuation 
systems across primates (see e.g. Levy and Glimcher, 2012). I am not 
concerned here with evaluating these claims. For present purposes, I 
critically examine the grounds on which NEs take their mechanistic 
insights to be explanatory for other economists.12 
 
NEs often appear to presuppose that information concerning the neural 
aetiology and antecedents of decisions is explanatory for other 
economists. Some seemingly take it for granted that acquiring 
mechanistic insights about the neural substrates of decisions ipso facto 
increases their ability to account for individuals’ choice behaviour. For 
example, after noting that “all economic activity flows through the 
brain” Camerer conjectures that “understanding brain function [will] be 
useful for understanding […] economic choice” (2008b, 47). Similarly, 
Zak takes it to be “self-evident” that since “economic decisions are 
made in the brain […] economic regularities can be understood, and 
economic models are based, on cognitive science” (2008, 301). Let us 
assess the cogency of these claims. 
 
                                                 
12 Various definitions of mechanism have been proposed. For instance, 
Machamer et al. characterize mechanisms as “entities and activities organized 
such that they are productive of regular changes” in the examined target 
systems (2000, 3). For his part, Glennan defines them as “complex system[s]” 
whose components produce the phenomena of interest via interactions that 
“can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations” 
(2005, 445). These definitions are not equivalent, yet are usually taken to be 
sufficiently similar to speak of a mechanistic account of explanation in a 
unified sense. 
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NEs’ studies of the neural substrates of decisions provide economists 
with several mechanistic insights that were previously unavailable to 
them. This, however, falls short of implying that NEs’ mechanistic 
insights are explanatory for economists. To see why, consider how 
variations in criteria of explanatory relevance across economics and 
neuroscience bear on the explanatory import of NEs’ contributions. 
What insights are explanatory for a modeller typically depends on a 
number of factors, ranging from the theoretical constructs she employs 
to her modelling purposes. NEs’ and other economists’ contributions 
frequently differ in these respects. In particular, their models are often 
premised on dissimilar assumptions as to whether mechanistic 
information is required to provide adequate explanations of choice and, 
if so, at what levels of description such mechanistic information is to be 
obtained. For these reasons, mechanistic insights concerning the neural 
substrates of decisions may simultaneously be highly explanatory for 
NEs, yet fail to be explanatory for other economists. To illustrate this, 
let us focus on some NE accounts of preference transitivity. 
 
Standard economic models of choice posit agents having transitive 
preferences. Yet, real-life individuals occasionally exhibit preferences 
that violate this transitivity requirement (see e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 
1982). These violations can occur not just due to individuals’ mistakes, 
but also because the subjective values individuals assign to choice 
options vary depending on what alternatives are available to them. Over 
the last few years, some studies indicated that value representations in 
the orbitofrontal cortex, whose activations allegedly predict choices 
across various rewards (see Section 2), are invariant for changes of 
menu (see e.g. Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008). Furthermore, the 
stated preferences of individuals with lesions in this region have been 
shown to violate transitivity more often than those of control subjects 
(see e.g. Fellows and Farah, 2007). These findings have led some 
authors to conjecture that when choices are based on values encoded in 
the orbitofrontal cortex, menu invariance constitutes “the 
neurobiological origin of preference transitivity” (Padoa-Schioppa, 
2011, 344). 
 
The aforementioned findings seem explanatory for NEs on the 
mechanistic account of explanation we are considering. At the same 
time, they do not appear to be explanatory for other economists. After 
all, standard economic theory remains agnostic regarding the neuro-
biological substrates of preference transitivity. Hence, information 
about such substrates does not directly speak to economists’ 
explanatory concerns. This, in turn, forces NEs to explicate why exactly 
findings about the neuro-biological substrates of preference transitivity 
would be explanatorily relevant for other economists. In this respect, it 
is worth emphasizing that the mere fact that some neural areas’ 
activations respect menu invariance by no means implies that the 
corresponding individuals will exhibit transitive preferences. For 
individuals’ preferences are typically influenced by the interactions of 
several areas, and only some of these areas’ activations are invariant for 
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changes of menu (see e.g. Kable and Glimcher, 2009, and Padoa-
Schioppa, 2011). 
 
iii) The interventionist account relates explanation to the identification 
of patterns of counterfactual dependence between one’s explanandum 
variable and explanans variables (see e.g. Woodward, 1997 and 2003). 
On this account, a model’s explanatory relevance depends on the range 
of what-if-things-had-been-different questions (w-questions) it answers 
regarding how hypothetical or counterfactual variations in the values of 
the explanans variables affect the value of the explanandum variable. In 
particular, a model’s generalizations are explanatory to the extent that 
they are invariant under interventions, i.e. manipulations that directly 
affect only the explanans variables of interest and do not correlate with 
any other cause of the explanandum variable. 
 
Prima facie, several NE contributions appear to fare quite well on the 
interventionist account. For instance, Kosfeld et al. (2005) document 
how inhaling oxytocin can significantly increase individuals’ propensity 
to trust others, yet without altering their risk preferences. Similarly, 
Pessiglione et al. (2006) show how administering drugs that 
respectively enhance (e.g. L-DOPA) and reduce (e.g. haloperidol) 
dopaminergic function modulates subjects’ ability to choose the most 
rewarding options across decision settings. These studies provide NEs 
with informative insights regarding how individuals’ choices can be 
altered by means of selective and reversible neurochemical 
manipulations. Even so, it is questionable whether such insights are 
explanatory for other economists. For disclosing patterns of 
counterfactual dependence between observed choices and neural 
activations does not per se enable one to identify invariant 
generalizations between economic variables. 
 
A proponent of NE may rebut that neural findings help economists to 
answer a wide range of w-questions concerning hypothetical and 
counterfactual variations in individuals’ decisions. In particular, she 
might contend that neural findings are more explanatory than 
behavioural and psychological findings, since they enable modellers to 
answer more w-questions regarding agents’ decisions than these other 
findings. Regrettably, NEs have not substantiated these assertions. 
Moreover, some claims to the contrary have been put forward in the 
literature. For instance, as persuasively illustrated by Kuorikoski and 
Ylikoski (2010), identified correspondences between neural activations 
and observed decisions do not enable NEs to answer a wide range of w-
questions outside the investigated experimental settings. Furthermore, 
choice models can be frequently made more explanatory in the 
interventionist sense by abstracting away from the neural substrates of 
decisions. Let me explicate this point. 
 
NEs can identify relatively fine-grained correspondences between 
decisions and neural activations by demonstrating how decisions vary 
under experimentally regimented interventions on anatomically 
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delimited neural areas. However, choice modellers can frequently 
answer a wider range of w-questions about agents’ decisions by 
targeting variations in psychological (e.g. motivations) rather than 
neural variables. Moreover, information concerning agents’ 
environmental constraints and incentives usually allows choice 
modellers to make generalizations that are invariant under a broader set 
of interventions than generalizations based on neural findings. To give 
one example, consider recent studies of the neuro-biological substrates 
of pathological gambling (see e.g. Holst et al., 2010, and Potenza, 
2008). 
 
The mere fact that pathological gamblers exhibit similar addictive 
propensities does not imply that they all share some common neuro-
biological syndrome that explains their behavioral similarities (Ross et 
al., 2008, ch.1). On the contrary, information regarding those agents’ 
environmental constraints (e.g. social sanctions) and incentives (e.g. 
visual cues triggering addictive responses) typically enables one to 
account for their behavioural similarities across a wider range of 
situations (see e.g. Robinson and Berridge, 2003, on the influence that 
exposure to cues can have on addicts’ behaviour). This does not 
preclude NEs from identifying informative generalizations concerning 
the neuro-biological substrates of pathological gambling (see e.g. Ross, 
2009, on how combining behavioural and neural findings allows 
researchers to answer a growing range of w-questions about agents’ 
addictive propensities). Yet, these substrates seem exceedingly 
heterogeneous across individuals and choice settings for generalizations 
based on neural findings to be invariant under a broader set of 
interventions than generalizations based on other disciplines’ findings. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
NEs’ calls to use neural findings in constructing and evaluating 
economic models often rest on the claim that such findings enable 
economists to improve their models of choice. In this article, I 
examined three respects in which NEs take neural findings to do so. 
The idea is that these findings enable economists to: increase the 
descriptive accuracy of their models (Section 1); provide more accurate, 
robust and reliable predictions of choices (Section 2); and build more 
explanatory models of choice (Section 3). As we have seen, economists 
can improve some models of choice with regard to specific desiderata 
by using neural findings. At the same time, there are at least two 
reasons to doubt NEs’ calls to employ such findings in constructing and 
evaluating economic models. 
 
The first reason, explored in Fumagalli (2011), is that due to the trade-
offs between the desiderata respectively valued by NEs and other 
economists, showing that neural findings help economists to satisfy 
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specific desiderata falls short of implying that NEs enable economists to 
build better models of choice. The second reason, discussed in the 
present paper, is that NEs have hitherto failed to significantly improve 
economic models even with regard to individual desiderata. Moreover, 
they gloss over methodological and evidential concerns that will 
continue to hinder their attempts to build models that supersede those 
developed by other economists. These concerns do not license 
unqualified scepticism regarding the prospects of NE. Still, taken 
together, they cast serious doubts on NEs’ calls to employ neural 
findings in constructing and evaluating economic models. 
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